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Methods and Severity: The Two
Tracks of Section 12
Lisa Kerr and Benjamin L. Berger*

The story of section 12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which
protects against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment,1 is
overwhelmingly told — by judges and scholars alike — as a tale about
proportionality. This is an artefact of the prominence of one problem that
Canadian courts have famously employed a muscular approach to section 12
to address: the problem of mandatory minimum sentences. Since Nur,2
the analytical path for evaluating the constitutionality of mandatory
minimum sentences has been firmly and clearly set.3 In Lloyd, the Court
summarized the jurisprudence: “The question, put simply, is this: In view
of the fit and proportionate sentence, is the mandatory minimum
sentence grossly disproportionate to the offence and its circumstances? If
so, the provision violates s. 12.”4 In this article, we argue that this focus
on comparison and proportionality as the analytic heart of cruel and
unusual treatment and punishment blurs a crucial distinction within
section 12, and thereby enervates the courts’ capacity to respond to the
range of wrongs that the section should be able to address.
When judges describe the evil at which section 12 is directed, they
use a welter of phrases. Section 12 prohibits state treatment or
punishment that is “abhorrent or intolerable”; “incompatible with human
*
Lisa Kerr is an Assistant Professor at Queen’s University, Faculty of Law. Benjamin L. Berger
is a Professor and York Research Chair in Pluralism and Public Law at Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University. We are grateful for the excellent feedback we received on a draft of this article from
participants at both the Queen’s-uOttawa Public Law Workshop and the Osgoode Hall Constitutional
Cases Conference, from Palma Paciocco, and from Paul Quick at the Queen’s Prison Law Clinic. Thanks
also to Ramna Safeer (JD candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School) for her outstanding research assistance.
1
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
R. v. Nur, [2015] S.C.J. No. 15, 2015 SCC 15 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nur”].
3
For the Court’s most recent description of the test, see R. v. Boudreault, [2018] S.C.J.
No. 58, 2018 SCC 58, at para. 46 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Boudreault”].
4
R. v. Lloyd, [2016] S.C.J. No. 13, 2016 SCC 13, at para. 23 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Lloyd”].
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dignity”; or “so excessive as to outrage standards of decency”.5 When
read within the world of the mandatory minimum sentence jurisprudence,
it is natural enough that these phrases are generally taken to be
synonymous with gross disproportionality. Grossly disproportionate
treatment or punishment is, indeed, cruel and unusual and that’s what’s
wrong with mandatory minimums. However, this equation of the
essential wrong addressed by section 12 with the particular analytical
approach appropriate to assessing the constitutionality of mandatory
minimum sentences obscures the important fact that two distinct species
of wrongful state punishment can offend standards of decency, be
abhorrent or intolerable to society, or violate human dignity. Otherwise
put, there are two routes — two tracks — by which one can arrive at the
fundamental wrong at the heart of section 12.The state can run afoul of
section 12 by punishing excessively (the “severity track”) or by using
intrinsically unacceptable methods of treatment or punishment (the
“methods track”). Importantly, each track demands a distinct method of
analysis from reviewing courts. To date, this distinction, and its
implications for section 12 analysis, has gone unrecognized in the case
law and scholarship alike.6
Indeed, evidence of this crucial distinction being blurred, and its
analytic consequences, can be found in the Court’s most recent decision
on section 12, R. v. Boudreault.7 As we discuss below, at certain key
argumentative points in the decision, the dissent and majority speak past
one another because, at these points, they are moving on different section
12 tracks. In particular, when Côté J., writing in dissent, notes that the
victim fine surcharge is quite unlike “the lash, the lobotomisation of
certain dangerous offenders, and the castration of sexual offenders”,8 she
introduces reasoning about intrinsically objectionable methods into a
5

Lloyd, id., at para. 24; R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, 2000 SCC 39, at para. 26
(S.C.C.); R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, at 1072 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Smith”]; and R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC 6, at para. 14 (S.C.C.). Canadian
judges have also often repeated that demonstrating a breach of s. 12 is “a high bar”. Lloyd, id., at
para. 24; Steele v. Mountain Institution, [1990] S.C.J. No. 111, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1385, at 1417
(S.C.C.).
6
Debra Parkes implicitly distinguishes between these tracks in “The Punishment Agenda
in the Courts” (2014) S.C.L.R. (2d) 589. While Parkes does not go so far as to argue that the two
tracks should attract different tests, she separates prison condition cases from cases concerning
mandatory minimums, and refers to the latter as “[a] dominant strand in the section 12 case law”, id.,
at 590.
7
[2018] S.C.J. No. 58, 2018 SCC 58 (S.C.C.).
8
R. v. Boudreault, at para. 183. Côté J.’s citation traces back to the 1987 Smith decision.
See R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, at 1073-74 (S.C.C.).
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case that is properly about severity of punishment. In so doing, aspects of
her reasons present certain of the analytic risks that arise when these two
tracks are not distinguished.9 Boudreault thus served as the provocation
for this piece in which we insist on the importance of distinguishing the
two tracks of section 12, even as our core motivation for so doing is
forward-looking. Drawing this distinction, delineating the distinctive
nature of the mischief with which each track is concerned, and
understanding the questions and analysis appropriate to each, are
essential to ensuring that judges are equipped to deal well with the
variety of forms of section 12 claims coming before the courts.
The plan for this article is as follows: Part 1 explains the distinction
between the two tracks in more detail, touching on why only one is welldeveloped in Canada. Part 2 makes the case for why drawing this
distinction matters, by describing two of the analytic problems that flow
from our current failure to distinguish between the two tracks of section
12. In this part, we demonstrate the importance of selecting the right
track through discussion of three examples: the Boudreault decision; the
constitutionality of section 745.1 of the Criminal Code,10 which
introduces the possibility of life sentences without the possibility of
parole; and the assessment of prison conditions pursuant to section 12.
Part 3 then puts the distinction, and its implications, on display through
examination of another pressing jurisprudential issue: how to distinguish
between and apply the two tracks to the specific topic of solitary
confinement. Conceptual confusion has caused problems here in recent
years, as Canadian courts have reflexively imported the severity frame
generated in mandatory minimum sentence cases to resolve complaints
that are not, at core, about proportionality. Finally, Part 4 addresses a
question that is a consequence of our argument: does distinguishing
between the two tracks assign prison conditions as relevant only to the
method track? Our answer is “no”. Consistent with arguments we have
developed separately in other pieces, the qualitative dimensions of
imprisonment should be understood as bearing directly on the character
of a sentence, and as such have a role to play in a gross
disproportionality analysis concerned with the severity of punishment.
9

As we discuss more fully below, Côté J. also gives considerable attention to the question
of the severity and proportionality of the surcharge, differing from the majority in how she assesses
the scheme and its effects on offenders. Thus, she discusses both tracks, but without attending to the
differences between them and without making clear that the case at bar is about severity rather than
an objectionable method.
10
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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I. PART 1: UNDERSTANDING THE TWO TRACKS
However uncultivated in the subsequent jurisprudence, one can find
the seeds of the idea that there are two distinct tracks within section 12 in
the first major Charter decision interpreting and applying the section, R.
v. Smith. Justice Lamer’s (as he then was) decision in Smith was attuned
to the two species of concern that we point to here, though his opinion
did not distinguish between them as sharply as we seek to here. Justice
Lamer held that a sentence that is “grossly disproportionate to what the
offender deserves”11 would run afoul of section 12. Thus, if having
considered “the gravity of the offence, the personal characteristics of the
offender and the particular circumstances of the case”,12 a court
concludes that the sentence would be “grossly disproportionate to what
would have been appropriate, then it infringes s. 12”.13 In this, he
anticipated the main line of the section 12 jurisprudence in the years that
followed.
Yet Lamer J. also made clear that the ultimate concern under section
12 is “the effect of the sentence actually imposed”.14 Yes, the
unconstitutional effect of a sentence could be the product of “its length
alone”, but Lamer J. was careful to recognize that “[t]he effect of the
sentence is often a composite of many factors and is not limited to
the quantum or duration of the sentence but includes its nature and the
conditions under which it is applied”.15 We see here an acknowledgment
that conditions of punishment may matter in the evaluation of the
proportionality of a sentence — a point to which we return at the end of
this paper. But Lamer J. goes further, acknowledging that the method of
punishment alone can drive the result under section 12. Some forms
of punishment or treatment “will always be grossly disproportionate and
will always outrage our standards of decency”.16 They will offend section
12 “by their very nature”.17
Justice Lamer clearly understood the distinct concerns that can arise
on each track. The severity of a sanction might exceed what is
appropriate, in light of all of the circumstances, or it might be a sanction
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Smith, at 1073.
Id., at 1073.
Id., at 1073.
Id., at 1073.
Id., at 1073.
Id., at 1073-74.
Id., at 1073.
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that, in its nature, offends our sense of decency and thus violates limits
on state action in the penal realm. Both concerns may well be present,
but they are not both required so as to find an infringement of section 12,
nor do they call for the same sets of considerations and questions from a
court. They are alternatives. It is this feature of Lamer J.’s first pass at
section 12 interpretation that we seek to recover and explore in this
article. We argue that the clarity and rationality of this area of law would
be improved, and the distinct harms recognized in Smith better protected
against, if we more clearly distinguish the two tracks of section 12
jurisprudence and the analytic method appropriate to each.
And so how ought we to describe and think about these two tracks of
section 12? How might the judicial lexicon for section 12 claims be
refined to reflect this important distinction?
The methods track is concerned with whether a particular form of
treatment or punishment is intrinsically cruel and unusual. In the
language used in the governing case law to describe the wrong that
section 12 is meant to address, such methods are per se abhorrent,
incompatible with human dignity,18 and outrage standards of decency.19
The question for a court when a section 12 claim is made on this track is
whether this particular form of sanction is, in its nature, one that the state
may permissibly employ. Determining whether a given method is
inherently objectionable in this manner will often require looking
carefully at the effects of the punishment, in addition to (and informing)
broader reflection on absolute normative standards.20 Crucially, though,
this is not an issue of proportionality between the sanction, on the one
hand, and the gravity of the offence and degree of responsibility of the
offender, on the other, nor does an assessment on this track depend on
comparing or calibrating the treatment or punishment at issue to an
18

Bacon v. Surrey Pre-trial Services Centre, [2010] B.C.J. No. 1080, 2010 BCSC 805, at
para. 300 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Bacon”].
19
Bacon, id., at para. 301; Smith, at 1072.
20
While s. 12 was not directly engaged in United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, 2001
SCC 7 (S.C.C.) (except as a value to be considered in the s. 7 balance), the decision is instructive on
what an examination of effects and reflection on normative standards involves. To decide whether
the government can extradite individuals to places where they may face the death penalty, the Court
noted that the problem is not only that capital punishment is inherently objectionable. The Court also
analyzed the range of effects that flow from the institution of capital punishment, including the
unique psychological impact of being held for long periods in the harsh conditions of death row
(known as the “death row phenomenon”). At para. 122: “The finality of the death penalty, combined
with the determination of the criminal justice system to try to satisfy itself that the conviction is not
wrongful, inevitably produces lengthy delays, and the associated psychological trauma to death row
inhabitants, many of whom may ultimately be shown to be innocent.”
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alternative, lesser sanction. The method of treatment is being challenged
as, in its very nature, constitutionally offensive. This track would apply
to section 12 challenges to capital punishment, corporal sanctions, and
some forms of confinement.
The severity track asks whether the extent of the use of a particular
treatment or punishment renders it cruel and unusual. On this track it is
the extent or amount — not the kind — of punishment or treatment that
might be intolerable, incompatible with human dignity, or an outrage to
standards of decency. The question a court must ask when assessing a
claim on this track is whether the severity of the punishment or treatment
being challenged is grossly disproportionate, when compared to a fit or
appropriate sanction.21 In answering this question, a court is interested in
the relationship to a particular (or reasonable hypothetical) offender’s
wrongdoing, culpability, and circumstances, and the degree to which the
challenged treatment or punishment is out of proper calibration with
those factors.22 We will argue that the effects of a punishment will also
matter here, insofar as they inform an assessment of severity and
proportionality.23 This is the form of analysis that our courts have
developed through the mandatory minimum sentence jurisprudence.24
Note that, on the severity track, the method of punishment employed is
assumed to be acceptable, at least in some measure — the method (for
example, incarceration in Nur, or fines in Boudreault) is not per se
offensive. For this reason, the two tracks have a logically sequential
relationship: where both are at issue, a court must first resolve the
question of whether there is a constitutional problem with the method of
punishment or treatment before switching to the severity track.25
21

R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, [2016] S.C.J. No. 14, 2016 SCC 14, at para. 71 (S.C.C.),
resolved that the Charter protects against grossly disproportionate punishment only. Proportionality
is a fundamental principle of sentencing, but it does not have constitutional status as a stand-alone
principle of fundamental justice.
22
The full list of relevant factors has been stated often in the cases: the gravity of the
offence, the personal characteristics of the offender, the particular circumstances of the case, the
actual effect of the treatment or punishment on the individual, relevant penological goals and
sentencing principles, the existence of valid alternatives to the treatment or punishment imposed, and
a comparison of punishments imposed for other crimes in the same jurisdiction. See, e.g., Smith, at
1073; R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, 2000 SCC 395, at para. 28 (S.C.C.).
23
Boudreault is, indeed, a good example of the way that effects of a sentence may inform
an assessment on the severity track.
24
See R. v. Nur, in which the Court asks whether the statutorily-imposed minimum
carceral term is “grossly disproportionate to the punishment that is appropriate, having regard to the
nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender”.
25
In cases challenging the amount of a fine (Boudreault) or the length of a prison sentence
(Lloyd, Nur), the reality is that the analysis need only proceed on the severity track alone. Fines and
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In the United States, for historical and institutional reasons, the
methods track is well-developed under Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. This is largely because the U.S. federal system and many
states continue to rely on the death penalty. While the U.S. Supreme
Court has declined the opportunity to abolish capital punishment as a
matter of constitutional law, it has articulated a complex jurisprudence
that narrows and restrains the institution of capital punishment. As
Rachel Barkow observes, the idea that “death is different” has been used
to justify a separate jurisprudence for the penalty of death: the Court will
scrutinize whether the penalty of death is proportionate to the crime and
the defendant, exempting certain crimes and certain offenders from a
capital sentence.26 In non-capital cases, by contrast, “the Court has done
virtually nothing to ensure that the sentence is appropriate.”27 Barkow
laments the near-absence of proportionality review — the other track —
in Eighth Amendment law.
The opposite situation is present in Canada. The methods track has
received little attention in Canadian law, largely because the death
penalty for all non-military offences was abolished by Parliament in
1976. In response to the proliferation of mandatory minimum sentences
in the early 2000s, Canadian courts and scholars have instead focused on
issues of severity and proportionality. But the failure to acknowledge and
develop the methods track has left critical facets of state punishment
unexamined through the lens of section 12. Of particular interest in this
piece, as Debra Parkes observed in 2014, is that section 12 has had
“relatively little application in relation to prison conditions”.28 As
Canadian courts increasingly hear arguments under section 12 that reach
beyond conventional challenges to mandatory term-of-years prison
sentences, including cases like Boudreault and claims concerning prison
conditions, it is crucial that Canadian courts acknowledge and breathe
life into this important distinction. We therefore now turn to explain why,
as a practical matter of sound constitutional analysis, drawing this
distinction matters so very much.
imprisonment are the paradigmatic methods of punishment in contemporary society. The norms of
acceptable punishment will evolve over time, but there is no doubt that neither fines nor
imprisonment will be considered inherently objectionable by a contemporary Canadian court.
26
Rachel Barkow, ‘The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity” (2009) 107:7 Mich. L. Rev. 1145.
27
Id., at 1146.
28
Debra Parkes implicitly distinguishes between these tracks in “The Punishment Agenda
in the Courts” (2014) S.C.L.R. (2d) 589, at 605.
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II. PART 2: WHY THE DISTINCTION MATTERS
Clearly understanding and insisting on drawing the distinction
between the two tracks of section 12 matters because running them
together creates the risk that section 12 claims will fail as a result of
analytic confusion, rather than for principled reasons. Blurring the two
tracks can make it more difficult for a section 12 claim — on either track
— to succeed, and for reasons that are not linked to the fundamental
purpose of the right. There are two problematic effects at work here, both
distortions in reasoning that are produced by judges searching for the
answer to the wrong kind of question. First, if a judge hunts for an
abhorrent method of punishment in a case that is really about a grossly
disproportionate use of an otherwise legitimate method, she may become
insensitive to the relevant wrong. Portions of Côté J.’s dissenting opinion
in Boudreault suggest this kind of error. Second, if a judge treats a case
about per se intolerable methods as a severity case, she may begin to
engage in inapt comparisons and measuring, seeking to answer a
proportionality question that is simply not posed. Doing so not only
raises the risk of misdirected analysis, it may also set up bad incentives
for prison officials. We expand on these two analytic risks below.
1. Treating Severity Cases like Methods Cases Makes the Wrong
Difficult to Locate
The first distortion arises when a judge allows questions and
standards appropriate to the methods track to blur into cases that are
properly about severity alone. When this occurs, a judge may unfairly
reject a plaintiff’s claim about gross disproportionality because the
method of punishment is generally acceptable. Hunting for the kinds of
wrongs associated with intrinsically intolerable methods of treatment or
punishment and not finding them, the case for a breach of section 12 can
seem weaker than it ought to if the focus remains fixed where it should in
a severity case: on the proportionality of the (otherwise acceptable)
punishment.
Aspects of the dissenting opinion in R. v. Boudreault illustrate exactly
this problem. At the heart of Côté J.’s dissent is a view that the impugned
mandatory victim surcharge at issue in the case — $100 for a summary
offence, $200 for indictable — was “not exorbitant”.29 Most Canadians,
29

Boudreault, at para. 137.
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she observes, would not find payment to be “particularly onerous”.30 On
their own, these observations could tuck comfortably into a proportionality
analysis appropriate to a case on the severity track: they might simply
inform an assessment of the severity of the punishment, a step along the
way to assessing whether it is grossly disproportionate. And, indeed,
much of Côté J.’s reasons engage with these questions of proportionality,
informed by the test established in Nur. In this dimension of her
judgment, her key points of difference with the majority judgment arise
from the kinds of burdens and deprivations each are willing to consider
as forming part of the “punishment” under constitutional review. In the
portion of her analysis focused on proportionality, Côté J. points to
certain features that ameliorate the severity of the scheme, including that
offenders who are unable to pay are entitled to an extension of time to
pay,31 are not to be imprisoned if they default due to poverty,32 and will
only rarely be deprived of liberty where necessary to compel attendance
at a committal hearing.33
But there is something else going on in Côté J.’s judgment and shaping
her view of the case. When she arrives at the end of her analysis, she
summarizes her assessment by comparing the victim fine surcharge to
custodial sentences, and crucially, to forms of treatment and punishment
that will always violate section 12: “the lash, the lobotomisation of certain
dangerous offenders, and the castration of sexual offenders”.34 Those
comparisons in mind, she concludes as follows: “my view is that the
requirement that all offenders pay a surcharge of only $100 or $200 per
offence — a surcharge which cannot be enforced against the liberty or
property of an offender who is simply too poor to pay — does not rise to
this level”.35 And of course she is right: a fine pales in comparison to these
abhorrent corporal sanctions. But this is the wrong kind of comparison for
the severity track. On this track, a court is concerned with the relationship
between the challenged treatment or punishment and a sanction that would
be a fit response to the hypothetical offender’s wrongdoing, culpability,
and circumstances. Reaching for a comparison to per se unconstitutional
methods of punishment overwhelms the proper inquiry, introducing
30

Id.
Id., at paras. 117 and 143.
32
Id., at para. 120.
33
Id., at para. 163.
34
Id., at para. 183. As noted earlier in this article, Côté J.’s citation traces back to the 1987
Smith decision. See R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, at 1073-74 (S.C.C.).
35
R. v. Boudreault, at para. 183.
31
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analytic noise that makes it difficult to detect the wrong at issue in the
case. Justice Côté’s examples are from a track of section 12 jurisprudence
that should have little application in a case concerned with excessive levels
of an otherwise legitimate form of sanction. In this way, failure to
distinguish the two tracks leads to an excessively narrow understanding of
the harm that section 12 prohibits.
Perhaps part of what makes Boudreault difficult to categorize is that,
unlike the typical case on the severity track, there is no particular offence
to ground the analysis. In Nur, the analysis of proportionality directed the
court to grapple with the offence of possessing a loaded prohibited
firearm. In Lloyd, the court had to grapple with the offence of possessing
controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking. There is no such
analysis of a particular offence in Boudreault, due to the odd design of
the provision. The amounts of either $100 or $200 that judges had to
impose were not connected to a particular offence, but only to whether
the offender committed a summary or indictable offence. This feature is
part of why the provision was so uniquely unable to ensure
proportionality between the nature of the offence and the circumstances
of the offender. This feature posed challenges for both Côté J. and the
majority, but the majority’s analysis stays firmly on the severity track.
Justice Martin shows that the surcharge becomes abhorrent when you
see that it will be an unpayable and indefinite burden for the highly
marginalized offenders who appear with “staggering regularity in our
provincial courts”.36 As Martin J. explains, “the effects of the same
surcharge will be experienced differently by those who are differently
situated”.37 The central problem is that sentencing judges had no ability
under the challenged provision to address the disproportionate financial
consequences that the fines would deliver to the indigent, regardless of their
moral culpability. Unable to pay, poor offenders subject to the fine had to
live with the threat of detention in relation to ongoing court appearances
and the administrative hassle of committal hearings. Sentencing judges had
no ability to craft a sentence in light of applicable legislative principles,
such as proportionality, rehabilitation, and Gladue factors.38 All of this adds
up, Martin J. reasons, to a breach of section 12 because of a problem of too
much punishment for at least a subset of offenders.
36

R. v. Boudreault, at para. 55.
Id., at para. 66. As James Foord put it in his oral argument for appellant Garrett Eckstein
at the Supreme Court: “This case is all about context, if it’s not about context then it’s only 100
bucks. Green fees.”
38
R. v. Boudreault, at paras. 81-83.
37
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The majority could have responded to Côté J.’s reference to the
corporal, bodily sanctions that will always violate section 12 by
observing that Boudreault is a case on the severity track. Justice Côté’s
move at this point in her reasons jumped the tracks, wrongly treating as
relevant the question of whether a fine is as intrinsically offensive to
human dignity and per se abhorrent to community standards as the lash
and lobotomization. This is a distorting move because, of course, a fine is
a highly legitimate form of sanction in general. The issue was whether
the victim surcharge could be grossly disproportionate, or too severe, in
at least some cases, having regard to the nature of the offence and the
circumstances of the offender. Justice Côté invoked the standard from
the methods track, and in so doing, arguably made it harder to locate the
wrong that was actually at issue. The risk of analytical distortion this
presents is one reason it is time to clearly recognize that section 12 of the
Charter covers two distinct tracks and to ask judges to be assiduous in
distinguishing the analysis appropriate to each.
2. Treating Methods Cases like Severity Invites Inapt Comparisons
and Measuring
The second distortion appears when, in a case properly on the
methods track, a judge allows severity reasoning to seep into the
analysis. When this occurs, a judge casts out looking for a standard
against which to measure the proportionality of the impugned
punishment or treatment when, in fact, the court is being called upon to
decide whether the nature and effects of the penal method are such that it
is constitutionally unavailable to the state. The comparative pole that the
judge reaches for in assessing proportionality might be the offender’s
wrongdoing, culpability, and circumstances, or it might be other existing
penal methods. And of course such comparison might play some role in
informing an assessment of whether a given method is intrinsically
beyond the normative pale — such comparison might help to illuminate
societal standards. But, unlike severity analysis, on the method track
proportionality assessments do not answer the question posed. Indeed,
they can be badly misleading. Very simply, the blurring of the two tracks
in this direction can lead a judge to answer the wrong question.
Consider the question of the constitutionality of section 745.51 of the
Criminal Code, which introduced the possibility of consecutive periods of
parole ineligibility for multiple convictions for murder. These “stacked”
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parole ineligibility periods can lead to sentences that amount to life
imprisonment without parole — so-called “whole life sentences”.
Analyzed using assessments of proportionality drawn from the severity
track, a section 12 challenge to this provision would have little hope of
success. Employing the framework developed in the mandatory minimum
sentence cases, a judge would ultimately ask whether the possibility of a
whole life sentence is grossly disproportionate to the harm caused by the
offences and the degree of responsibility and circumstances of the
offender. By that metric, the challenge would be consigned to fail; indeed,
section 745.51 might help to generate a scheme of greater proportionality,
given our existing sentencing framework. As Campbell J. explained in just
such a constitutional challenge to this provision, multiple murders “cause
greater harm, with greater moral culpability, than cases involving but a
single murder, and therefore are often deserving of greater punishment”.39
But the comparison is inapt because the real complaint about section
745.51 is a concern about methods. Whether such sentences are
proportional or not, the gravamen of the section 12 concern about this
section is that there is something intrinsically abhorrent about consigning
a person to die in prison, stripping them of any hope of future liberty. For
this reason, and though he did not draw the sharp distinction that we urge
here, Campbell J. was right, in Granados-Arana, to move past the
question of proportionality and to also ask the fundamental question on
the methods track: whether this provision, which allows the possibility of
a life sentence without parole eligibility, “demean[s] or violate[s] human
dignity in violation of s. 12 of the Charter”.40 Although we might quarrel
with his conclusion that it does not, and in particular with his view that
the royal prerogative of mercy is sufficient to stave off those
unconstitutional effects, this is the right question. In cases on the
methods track, questions of proportionality, of the existence of discretion
and safety-valves,41 and comparisons with harms and culpability all

39
R. v. Granados-Arana, [2017] O.J. No. 5964, 2017 ONSC 6785 at para. 141 (Ont. S.C.J.)
[hereinafter “Granados-Arana”].
40
Granados-Arana, id., at para. 142, per Campbell J.
41
In Granados-Arana, id., at para. 143, Campbell J. lays heavy emphasis on the fact that s.
745.51 is a discretionary provision, and as such, “where such a consecutive parole ineligibility
period order would be excessive, grossly disproportionate, or otherwise inappropriate, the sentencing
judge can simply order the parole ineligibility periods to be served concurrently”. In this, he falls
back into thinking drawn from the severity track. If the method is inherently violative of s. 12, it can
never lie in the hands of the state. On the adequacy of the royal prerogative as one such safety-valve
for this issue, see Derek Spencer, “Does the Royal Prerogative of Mercy Offer Hope for Murderers?
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distract from that essential focus: whether this is a penal method that is
per se objectionable. That must be the analytic focus in any future
challenges to this provision.
Another form of inapt comparison resulting from treating methods
cases like severity cases arises from an example that draws us closer to
the focus of the next section of this paper: solitary confinement. The
example is an Ontario Court of Appeal decision on the constitutionality
of prison conditions experienced at Maplehurst Correctional Complex.42
In this case, Laskin J.A. attempted to measure the proportionality of an
impugned punishment in a case that was really a complaint about an
unacceptable penal method. Once again, a blurring of the tracks makes a
section 12 challenge more difficult to prove, for reasons unlinked to the
underlying wrongs that the section seeks to avoid.
During two years of pre-trial detention at Maplehurst, Jamil Ogiamien
and Huy Nguyen were often held in lockdowns: confined to their cells
for most of the day and night for several months. The application judge
held that the lockdowns violated section 12, and awarded Charter
damages in the amount of $60,000 and $25,000 to Ogiamien and
Nguyen, respectively.43 In overturning that decision, the Ontario Court of
Appeal held that the frequency and duration of these lockdowns, which it
said were caused largely by staff shortages, did not violate section 12.
The litigants in Ogiamien did not ask the court to distinguish between
the two tracks in the way we do here, but this case was clearly a
complaint about the method of state treatment. Indeed, as remanded
prisoners, Ogiamien and Nguyen did not even stand convicted of an
offence. As such, they were not in a position to allege a lack of
proportionality between the punishment or treatment they experienced
when compared to a fit or appropriate sanction. Still, the Ogiamien court
used the severity lens to analyze the complaint; and, since there was no
convicted offence to ground the analysis, the court thought it had to first
decide what were “proportionate” or “ordinary” prison conditions.
Rather than asking whether extensive lockdown is a constitutionally
available method of state treatment in pre-trial facilities in contemporary
Canada, it asked whether the lockdowns departed from a norm.
Further International Guidance for Interpreting the Protecting Canadians by Ending Sentence
Discounts for Multiple Murders Act” (2019) 24 C.C.L.R. 313.
42
Ogiamien v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), [2017] O.J.
No. 4401, 2017 ONCA 667, at para. 10 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Ogiamien Ont. C.A.”].
43
Ogiamien v. Ontario, [2016] O.J. No. 2444, 2016 ONSC 3080 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter
“Ogiamien Ont. S.C.J.”].
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Justice Laskin said there is a two-step process to determine whether
treatment is cruel and unusual:
The first step establishes a benchmark. In this case step one looks at the
treatment of [the inmates] under “appropriate” prison conditions — that
is their treatment under ordinary conditions in the remand units when
there were no lockdowns. Step two assesses the extent of the departure
from the benchmark. In this case step two looks at the effect of the
lockdowns on [the inmates’] treatment. If the effect of the lockdowns
resulted in treatment that was grossly disproportionate to their treatment
44
under ordinary conditions then their s.12 rights would be violated.

Justice Laskin continued by noting that ordinary prison conditions at
Maplehurst, absent lockdowns, allow inmates six hours of daily access to
the dayroom to socialize, shower, watch television, read and make
telephone calls. Inmates can also access an exercise yard for 20-30 minutes
each day, participate in programming and receive visits. Lockdowns
occurred for about 50 per cent of the time in 2014, and 55 per cent in 2015,
but Laskin J.A. emphasized that the lockdowns that affected Ogiamien and
Nguyen directly were slightly less than that, averaging 20-30 per cent of
the time from 2014-2016. Approximately 1/3 of those lockdowns affected
them for only part of the day. For the other 2/3, they were confined to their
cells for 24 hours per day, in a small cell with another person. The court
accepted their evidence that a lockdown involved stress, no stimuli, no
exercise, no family visits, no telephone, no clean linen, and no access to
programming.45 Ultimately, the court concluded that “[t]he treatment of
Ogiamien and Nguyen under lockdowns compared to their treatment under
ordinary conditions may have been excessive or disproportionate, but it
was not grossly disproportionate. Thus their treatment did not meet the
high bar required to establish a s.12 violation.”46
We do not argue that the Ogiamien appeal was rightly or wrongly
decided (there were several more issues before the Court that we do not
discuss here). Rather, we want to emphasize that the legal framework
developed in the mandatory minimum context is a poor fit for resolving a
complaint about extensive periods of cellular confinement in a pre-trial
facility. The inmates in Ogiamien raised a complaint about intolerable
methods. By treating that complaint like a severity case, Laskin J.A. tried
44

Ogiamien Ont. C.A., at para. 10.
Id., at para. 42. Both inmates said that staff tried to maintain access to essential services,
including medical and lawyer visits. Showers were inconsistently available during lockdowns.
46
Id., at para. 57.
45
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to answer a proportionality question that was simply not posed. The lens
of “gross disproportionality” does not help to resolve a complaint
brought by remanded inmates about conditions of confinement. The
complaint is not about excessive responses to wrongdoing but about
penal methods alleged to be, in their nature, objectionable.
Along with the risk of misdirected analysis, this approach may set up bad
incentives for prison officials. Notice how Laskin J.A. tries to compare
“ordinary” prison conditions with the impugned conditions, in order to
satisfy the comparative demand inherent in the gross disproportionality
analysis. Prison officials will soon realize that ensuring austere norms as part
of ordinary conditions will help to protect against successful complaints
asserting deviation from the norm. If we handle prison condition cases by
comparing impugned treatment to “ordinary” conditions in a particular
institution, institutions can avoid constitutional review by ratcheting down
general standards.47 Prisons and jails could simply work to ensure that
ordinary conditions are austere and punitive in order to put a finger on the
comparative scales. Consider Ogiamien: What if “ordinary” conditions at
Maplehurst involved leaving a cell just once per week so as to access a brief
shower? If lockdowns result in the loss of that minimal weekly reprieve
from extreme solitary, would we say there is no constitutional problem
because the new treatment is not a significant deviation from an established
norm?48 Let us say more about the need to distinguish these two tracks and
properly apply the method track in the context of ongoing cases challenging
the constitutionality of solitary confinement.

III. PART 3: HOW THE METHODS TRACK APPLIES TO
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
The Ogiamien approach is followed, to a degree, in Canadian Civil
Liberties Association v. Canada (Attorney General).49 The CCLA case
47
This is the same incentives problem that arises under Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472
(1995), in which the U.S. Supreme Court holds that inmates only have a liberty interest protected by
the Due Process clause when a prison regulation “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”. Austere hardships across the board can
work to dilute or extinguish Due Process protections for incarcerated people.
48
At the very least, the comparison should not be to ‘ordinary’ prison conditions in the institution
under consideration. The application judge in Ogiamien Ont. S.C.J., referred extensively to the Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Mandela Rules), at paras. 211-215, as an “aid in
interpreting the rights conferred by the Charter”. (Thanks to Anthony Sangiuliano for offering this point.)
49
Canadian Civil Liberties Association v. Canada (Attorney General), [2019] O.J.
No. 1537, 2019 ONCA 243 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “CCLA”]. The Supreme Court of Canada has
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was a constitutional challenge to the federal legislative provisions that
authorize “administrative segregation”, otherwise known as solitary
confinement and defined as the practice of locking inmates in cells for 22
or more hours a day, indefinitely.50 In one part of her judgment on the
constitutionality of these provisions, Benotto J. says that section 12
requires her to compare solitary to conditions in general population.
Drawn to precedents like Ogiamien that blur the two tracks, Benotto J.
writes that “a proper comparative exercise must consider the effects of
prolonged administrative segregation against incarceration in an ordinary
prison range”.51
In the crucial part of her analysis, however, Benotto J. is clear that
solitary violates section 12 because of its harmful effects — because
placement in a cell for most of the day and night exposes inmates to a
risk of “severe and often enduring negative health consequences”.52 Her
analysis is not comparative in substance. There is no discussion of the
particular conditions or health effects that flow from ordinary maximumsecurity confinement.
In a move that helps to free her analysis from comparisons to ordinary
imprisonment, Benotto J. Cites Toure v. Canada (Public Safety
& Emergency Preparedness), in which LaForme J.A. rejects an argument
that judges must strictly follow a two-step comparative proportionality
test in what is effectively a complaint about a penal method.53 In the
context of indefinite and prolonged immigration detention, LaForme J.A.
reminds us that section 12 claims involving penal methods must be
analyzed primarily by looking at the nature and effects of the state
treatment at issue. As he puts it: “a determination of whether treatment is
cruel and unusual requires a focus on the effect of the conduct in question
— does it give rise to cruel and unusual treatment?”54

been asked to adjudicate an appeal of the CCLA decision, which will likely be paired with an appeal
of the B.C. decision declaring the law that governs solitary to be unconstitutional: British Columbia
Civil Liberties Association v. Canada (Attorney General), [2019] B.C.J. No. 1151, 2019 BCCA 228
(B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “BCCLA”].
50
See ss. 31-37 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20, which
have been amended in the wake of CCLA and BCCLA decisions.
51
CCLA, at para. 97.
52
Id., at para. 97.
53
Toure v. Canada (Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness), [2018] O.J. No. 4230, 2018
ONCA 681, at para. 57 (Ont. C.A.), dismissing an argument that the judge below failed to strictly
ask: (1) what treatment would have been appropriate, and (2) measure the actual treatment against
this benchmark.
54
Id., at para. 61 (emphasis added).
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Like Lamer J. in Smith, LaForme J.A. is attuned to how a sanction
might, in its nature, offend our sense of decency and thus violate limits
on state action in the penal realm. Justice LaForme reminds us that it is
often the effects of a punishment that will disclose whether a given
method is inherently objectionable, and this is precisely the approach that
the solitary confinement cases require. Beneath the surface of her citation
to Ogiamien, that is the approach Benotto J. takes in CCLA. Her opinion
is not, in fact, predicated on a view that solitary is a problem because it
departs from ordinary prison conditions. Rather, she points to the
powerful findings of the application judge on these issues, showing that
the problem with solitary is that it causes foreseeable and expected harm
when it extends beyond 15 days.55 The substance of Benotto J.’s
approach accords with that required for a case on the methods track.56
To return to the distinction we are pressing in this article, it is clear
that the problem with solitary is not a lack of proportionality with the
nature of an offence or the circumstances of an offender, nor is it a
problem with the degree of departure from treatment unfolding
elsewhere in the prison. The acceptability of solitary confinement, at
least as it has been legislated and practiced in Canadian prisons and jails
in recent decades, is best revealed by pursuing analysis on the methods
track: asking whether it is an unacceptable penal method that outrages
our standards of decency.57 Justice Benotto was convinced that solitary
infringes section 12 because of its negative effects on health, which has
55

CCLA, at para. 73.
In British Columbia, the trial judge opted to decide a challenge to the laws authorizing
solitary confinement under s. 7 rather than s. 12. See the reasoning on this issue set out at BCCLA, at
paras. 524-534, Leask J. appeared to accept the government’s argument that s. 12 fundamentally
requires an individual analysis, and that the absence of a personal plaintiff in that case precluded a
sufficient factual record to determine whether the “conditions, duration and reasons for segregation”
of a particular inmate violate s. 12 (at para. 527, citing R. v. Marriott, [2014] N.S.J. No. 139, 2014
NSCA 28, at para. 38 (N.S.C.A.)). In CCLA, Benotto J. rejected that same argument, noting that
while many cases are brought by individuals and thus turn on detailed evidence of the treatment they
endured, that does not preclude the application of s. 12 to other contexts (paras. 94-95). The
Supreme Court of Canada is likely to address this issue, along with a number of related issues
regarding the availability of Charter remedies in the context of public interest litigation arising from
both the B.C. and Ontario solitary appeals.
57
See, for example, the discussion in R. v. Prystay, [2019] A.J. No. 7, 2019 ABQB 8 (Alta.
Q.B.), which awards a significant sentencing discount in recognition of time spent in pre-trial
segregation. “Societal views on what is acceptable treatment or punishment evolve over time. Forced
sterilization, residential schools, lobotomies to treat mental disorders, corporal punishment in
schools and the death penalty are all examples of treatment once considered acceptable. Segregation
ravages the body and the mind. There is growing discomfort over its continued use as a quick
solution to complex problems.” (para. 128).
56
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been a powerful line of concern about solitary confinement for many
years.58 Others might emphasize that indefinite solitary in the absence of
procedural fairness is what gives rise to an experience of isolation that
violates section 12. The point is that the wrong of solitary is not
disclosed by examining the degree to which it departs from ordinary
prison conditions, whatever those may be.

IV. PART 4: THE RELATION BETWEEN PRISON CONDITIONS
AND PROPORTIONALITY
Our discussion of solitary confinement as a type of case on the
methods track raises an important question that we wish to address
before concluding this article: are prison conditions only relevant to the
methods track of section 12? Otherwise put, are the conditions and
effects of imprisonment ever relevant to a complaint about severity? Our
view is that they are. We have insisted here that the essential question for
the severity track — proportionality — is not a central concern for the
methods track, focused as it is on the normative evaluation of the lived
effects of a given treatment or punishment. But the converse cannot be
said: the effects of an otherwise acceptable method of imprisonment are
indeed relevant when assessing whether a given punishment is grossly
disproportionate, in violation of section 12. This position follows
naturally from an argument that we have each advanced versions of
elsewhere, namely that the qualitative features, consequences, and
experience of incarceration — not just the quantitative issue of duration
— must be considered when assessing the individualized circumstances
of the offender and the true gravity of a given sanction.59 If it is true that
prison conditions and their individualized impact on an offender help us
understand the severity of a sentence, and with this, the proportionality
of the punishment, they must also be relevant to evaluations of gross
disproportionality under the section 12 severity track.
58
This line of concern is particularly prevalent when it comes to isolating mentally ill inmates.
David Fathi, director of the ACLU National Prison Project, says that a rule against placing the seriously
mentally ill in solitary is no longer in dispute under American law: every federal court to consider the
question has held that supermax-style confinement of the seriously mentally ill is unconstitutional. David
C. Fathi, “The Common Law of Supermax Litigation” (2004) 24:2 Pace L. Rev. 675, at 681-84.
59
See Benjamin L. Berger, “Sentencing and the Salience of Pain and Hope” (2015) 70
S.C.L.R. (2d) 337; and Dwight Newman & Malcolm Thorburn, eds., The Dignity of Law: The Legacy
of Justice Louis LeBel (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2015); Lisa Kerr, “How the Prison is a Black
Box in Punishment Theory” (2019) 69:1 University of Toronto L.J. 85; Lisa Kerr, “Sentencing Ashley
Smith: How Prison Conditions Relate to the Aims of Punishment” (2017) 32:2 C.J.L.S. 187.
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The recent decision in R. v. Sharma is one powerful illustration of how
prison conditions can impact a case on the severity track.60 In Sharma,
Hill J. strikes down the mandatory minimum penalty of two years for
importing cocaine under section 6(3)(a.1) of the Controlled Drugs and
Substances Act,61 on the basis of gross disproportionality. In the course of his
analysis, he points to several concerns about the impact of penitentiary
confinement on some offenders, including those with pre-existing health
problems,62 those who will be incarcerated far from home,63 and Indigenous
people who experience disproportionate burdens of incarceration.64 Justice
Hill is clear that the lens of “gross disproportionality” under section 12
requires judges to consider more than the length of sentence alone: “the s. 12
Charter protection is not confined to one-dimensional focus upon sentence
duration but rather the quality and effect of the punishment on the offender
including the nature and conditions under which it is applied”.65
In this respect, Sharma draws from Smith. As we discuss above, Smith
makes clear that the nature or quality of punishment can be grounds for
finding a section 12 breach. Smith was a challenge to a mandatory length
of confinement of seven years for a broadly defined drug trafficking
offence. This case is clearly on the severity track, but in his majority
reasons Lamer J. said that when analyzing whether a sanction will be
grossly disproportionate, courts should consider not only length but also
the effect and conditions of a sentence. He noted that the “effect of the
sentence is often a composite of many factors”; that it is “not limited to
the quantum or duration of the sentence but includes its nature and the
conditions under which it is applied”.66 Justice Lamer describes a
hypothetical scenario to show how decisions made in the correctional
context may combine to create an unacceptably severe sentence:
Sometimes by its length alone or by its very nature will the sentence be
grossly disproportionate to the purpose sought. Sometimes it will be the
result of the combination of factors which, when considered in
isolation, would not in and of themselves amount to gross
disproportionality. For example, twenty years for a first offence against
property would be grossly disproportionate, but so would three months
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

R. v. Sharma, [2018] O.J. No. 909, 2018 ONSC 1141 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Sharma”].
S.C. 1996, c. 19.
Sharma, at paras. 216-220.
Id., at para. 121.
Id., at paras. 121-123.
Id., at para. 146.
Smith, at 1073.
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of imprisonment if the prison authorities decide it should be served in
67
solitary confinement.

This passage from Smith suggests that a sentence may become grossly
disproportionate in light of the conditions experienced by an offender.
Justice Lamer’s obiter suggestion has not received much attention, but it
serves as an example of how penal treatment might inform a complaint
on the severity track. His use of the example of solitary confinement is
particularly instructive for purposes of this piece. The effects of certain
prison conditions might be the basis for a claim that the treatment at
issue is inherently abhorrent and that the state may never use it. But even
in the absence of a finding that the method is per se impermissible,
taking account of those same effects might render the punishment
excessive to the point of gross disproportionality. As in Sharma, and
when it comes to the penal method of incarceration, which will never be
ruled inherently cruel and unusual, the implication is important and
provocative: the actual effects and conditions of imprisonment are
relevant to section 12, no matter the track.

V. CONCLUSION
The wrong that section 12 is ultimately concerned with is the same
under both tracks: treatment or punishment that is abhorrent or
intolerable, offends standards of decency, or violates human dignity.
While the end point is the same, we have argued here that complaints
about penal methods require a specific analytical approach, distinct from
that employed to assess the proportionality of an otherwise acceptable
kind of punishment.
It may be helpful to conclude by returning to McIntyre J.’s rich
dissenting opinion in Smith, which offers clarifying historical
perspective. Justice McIntyre reminds us that the two tracks emerged at
different points in our legal history. Originally, he writes, the prohibition
against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment was aimed at
“punishments which by their nature and character were inherently cruel”.68
67

Id., at 1073.
Smith, at para. 85, citing R. v. Miller, [1976] S.C.J. No. 91, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680 (S.C.C.), R.
v. Shand, [1976] O.J. No. 2178, 30 C.C.C. (2d) 23 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Konechny, [1983] B.C.J. No.
2244, 10 C.C.C. (3d) 233 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Langevin, [1984] O.J. No. 3159, 11 C.C.C. (3d) 336 (Ont.
C.A.), and the American cases; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion); People v.
Broadie, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 471 (1975); Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2nd Cir. 1978); and Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
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Here one can imagine the medieval punishment of drawing and quartering
in the town square or, today, the sensory and social deprivation that inheres
in many forms of solitary confinement. The limit on cruel and unusual
punishment has since been extended, McIntyre J. writes, to punishments
which, though not inherently cruel, are “so disproportionate to the offence
committed that they become cruel and unusual”.69 Punishment that is
not per se cruel and unusual, “may become cruel and unusual due to excess
or lack of proportionality”.70 Examples from our jurisprudence include the
large fines imposed on indigent offenders for minor wrongdoing in
Boudreault, or seven-years imprisonment for a first-time importer of a
single marijuana cigarette in Smith. Justice McIntyre disagreed with the
majority on whether the latter violated section 12 and, on that front, his
views have been clearly rejected in the subsequent jurisprudence. But his
careful attention to the distinct paths of section 12 is what we have sought
to recover in this article. If our goal is to draw meaningful limits on state
punishment that are responsive to the realities of our practices of
punishment, courts should recognize and embrace this distinction and its
analytic consequences.

69
70

Smith, at para. 84.
Id.

